Celebrated by academics, multilateral organizations, policy-makers and the media, Mexico's Progresa/Oportunidades conditional cash transfers program (CCT) is constantly used as a model of a successful anti-poverty program. Here I argue that the transformation of well-trained scholars into influential practitioners played a fundamental role in promoting a new conceptual approach to poverty reduction, ensuring the technical soundness and effectiveness of the program, incorporating rigorous impact evaluation, and persuading politicians to implement and keep the program in place.
Aimed at reducing current and future poverty, Oportunidades transfers cash to eligible poor families as long as conditions-also known as co-responsibilities-are fulfilled. Oportunidades has three main components: education, nutrition, and health. The education component grants cash transfers based on school attendance; in-kind transfers of school supplies, which are sometimes given as an additional cash transfer; and scholarships for each year of high school that students complete that can be retrieved from their interest bearing account only if the student graduates by the age of 22. The nutrition and health components offer cash and in-kind transfers (nutritional supplements, vaccinations, preventative treatments, and so forth), based on regular visits to a health clinic and the mother and teenagers' attendance at health talks. In 2007, a fourth component was added to provide beneficiaries with a subsidy for their electricity bills 10 Beneficiaries are selected based on a multi-stage targeting process that depends, among other things, on a composite deprivation index known as the "Sistema Unico de Puntajes" (SUP).
The formula of the SUP is kept confidential but it essentially takes into account dwelling characteristics as well as the age and gender composition of the household (in particular, the presence of children and elderly members Behrman (2007) concludes that "the initial formulation of the program was motivation to basically make transfers to poor households more effective (with less leakage) and better targeted by shifting from effectively inframarginal in-kind food transfers to cash transfers conditional on behaviors affecting all household members (through the conditionalities on health and nutrition related checkups), with the schooling conditionalities added late in the pre-program development phase (Levy 2006) ." Research had established that targeted price subsidies such as tortilla and other food price subsidies in Mexico were not really helping the poorest of the poor. 14 In addition, there was not even a clear sense of whether these subsidies contributed to higher nutrition outcomes among the poor. Even though the targeted tortilla (Tortibono) and milk (Liconsa) subsidies were progressive in relative terms (that is, the value of the subsidy in proportion to household income varied inversely with the latter), they were costly to operate and regressive in absolute terms (that is, the per capita value of the subsidy varied directly with household income) primarily because the beneficiaries were urban households. The latter meant that the non-poor received a higher share of the subsidy than the poor: the poorest population quintile received just 8.5 percent and 17.3 percent of the milk and tortilla subsidies, respectively.
Spearheaded by Santiago Levy (President Zedillo's Undersecretary of Budget in the powerful Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico (SHCP)), since December 1994 the country's anti-poverty spending became increasingly more targeted to the poor. 15 The generalized (urban) consumer subsidy was gradually replaced by targeted tortilla (Tortibono) and milk (Liconsa) subsidies. Even though the share of the benefits accruing to the poorest quintile rose, these two programs were costly to operate and mainly urban, and even within urban areas they were not really targeted to the 13 Greenspun (2011) . 14 World Bank on targeted transfers; Lustig in Cornelius, Craig and Fox; Kehoe and Serra-Puche (1986) on price subsidies cited in Lustig (1997); and Scott (2002) . 15 The concept of targeted spending as an explicit category reported separately was introduced in official public sector accounts in the mid 1990's.
poorest households. The general tortilla subsidy was scrapped in 1998, and resources previously used for food subsidies were reallocated to rural areas through Progresa. This shift transformed the broadly neutral distribution of government spending on food subsidies into a highly progressive one: Research had also established that paying attention to targeting mechanisms to avoid leakages and negative incentives was crucial. Finally, research had also been instrumental in showing the importance of intra-household dynamics and why it was better to grant resources to women/mothers than men/fathers for the transfers to be more effective in building poor children's human capital. According to Behrman (2007) , Santiago Levy suggested that research had influenced the design of Progresa regarding: "(a) the ineffectiveness of previous food aid strategies (e.g., not well targeted, inframarginal income effects, high transaction and bureaucratic costs of in-kind programs;
limitations of supply-side interventions), (b) the importance of intrahousehold allocations and therefore the need to make programs be conditional on benefits received by all household members, (c) related gender concerns, and (d) that food problems are not the same as nutritional problems. …
[T]he most important explicit studies that affected his thinking were Besley and Kanbur (1988, 1990) on food subsidy programs, Haddad and Kanbur (1989, 1990) on the extent of intrahousehold inequalities in the distribution of nutrients, Behrman and Deolalikar (1987, 1988) on low nutrient elasticities with respect to income, Schultz on schooling, Castañeda on targeting using the SISBEN in Colombia, and Streeten (1989a, b) on the poverty and on the relations between health and nutrition." (Behrman, 2007, p. 17) In fact, Levy's World Bank paper on "Poverty Alleviation in Mexico" (1991b Mexico" ( , 1994 that included many of the ideas that underlay the development of Progresa features 71 references with named authors.
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Another key figure in bringing scholarly work into the design of Progresa/Oportunidades was the late José "Pepe" Gómez de León, the program's first Director. 17 The author recollects his keen concern in developing a targeting method that would minimize perverse incentives such as making beneficiary households work less so that they would not pass the income threshold that assured them of benefits. This gave rise to the SUP, the confidential formula used by Progresa/Oportunidades to select beneficiaries. A quantitative demographer/sociologist by training, Gómez de León directly contributed to the formalization (i.e., the mathematical formulation) of the targeting mechanism. For close to four years, Gómez de León dedicated himself wholeheartedly to this aim, combining visits to the field in dire circumstances, coordinating disparate government agencies, 16 The references that Levy (2007) cites as key in his thinking regarding his contribution to the development of Progresa cite other previous scholarly work as well. For example, Besley and Kanbur cite Scobie (1983) ; Behrman and Deolalikar (1987) cite Pinstrup-Andersen and Caicedo (1978) and Timmer and Alderman (1979) plus a number of citations to Behrman; Behrman and Deolalikar (1988) cite Alderman (1984) , Alderman and Von Braun (1984) , Pinstrup-Andersen (1985) , von Braun and de Haen (1983)-plus eight citations to studies by Schultz and a number of citations to studies by Behrman; Streeten (1989a) refers to four studies by Lipton (1983a Lipton ( , b, 1985 Lipton ( , 1988a and also refers to a study by Schultz to which Lipton (1988a) refers; and Streeten (1989b) refers to International Food Policy Research Institute (1986) and Reutlinger and Alderman (1980) in addition to one of the Lipton studies (Behrman, 2007) . The relatively large number of citations spanning a period of 10-15 years suggests the field of anti-poverty analysis had built a "critical mass" of knowledge ready to be applied in practice. 17 Gómez de León was director of the Progresa from 1997 to 2000 when he died of cancer (melanoma). 18 Behrman (2007) concludes that although he had "… not found any citations by Gómez de León in his studies before PROGRESA was initiated to research by the IFPRI evaluation team members or IFPRI more broadly, … two of his 1999 studies with Parker (Gómez de León and Parker 1999a, b) , however, do cite seven studies by IFPRI staff or by the evaluation team members that were written before the initiation of PROGRESA (in addition to studies that came out of the evaluation): Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman (1997) , Haddad and Reardon (1993), Quisumbing (1994) , and Schultz (1990) on gender and intrahousehold allocations; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and Heckman and Todd (1996) on propensity score matching estimators and evaluation; and Newman, Rawlings, and Gertler (1994) on using randomization for evaluation of social policies in developing countries. This suggests that, although Gómez de León did not cite these studies before 1997, Gómez de León and Parker in 1999 at least thought that these studies captured important dimensions of the evolving conventional wisdom on these topics at the time that Gómez de León was engaged in developing PROGRESA." (Behrman, 2007, p. 18) shielding the program from predatory politicians, and promoting high quality research on the program's effects (including his own).
Very early on, Gómez de León recognized that the program's ability to survive political attacks would depend on demonstrating Progresa's success in achieving its goals through rigorous external evaluations undertaken by internationally recognized scholars. As a result, "… PROGRESA incorporated data collection and systematic evaluation as an integral component from the start, with an initial experimental design in rural areas with random assignment for the first 18 months of treatment among 506 rural communities (320 with treatment starting in 1998, 186 initial controls with treatment starting in 2000) with over 24,000 households and over 120,000 individuals in the evaluation sample over the 1997-2000 period and with subsequent control samples selected through propensity score matching (PSM) in both rural and urban areas. Indeed one major reason that PROGRESA is so wellknown has been the centrality of efforts at serious evaluation from the start-in contrast to other … anti-poverty and human resource investment programs (particularly in Brazil) on which information has not been collected to permit systematic evaluation." (Behrman, 2007, p. 3)
The author recalls a conversation with Gómez de León in 1997, right before or around the time she became Senior Advisor on Poverty and Chief of the Poverty and Inequality Unit of the IDB in September of that year. During this conversation, the author and Gómez de León agreed that it was essential to put in place an independent, high quality evaluation of the program to help improve its performance and political resiliency. This gave rise to the organization of a workshop convened by the author and held on December 10, 1997 at the IDB. This meeting set the stage for the subsequent comprehensive evaluation of Progresa by IFPRI.
Behrman's account of how this came about may be illustrative: (Coady 2007 , Haddad 2007 , Lustig 1995 , 1997a ,b, 2007 , Parker 2007 , Schultz 2007 ). Lustig (1995) (Behrman, 2007, p. 19) 3. Impact Evaluation and its Influence on Progresa's Political Survival and International increase of 24 percent in rural areas. 20 Of note was enrollment in secondary education in rural areas, which rose by 11 percent for girls and 7.5 percent for boys two years after the program was launched. 21 Another study found that demand for health services among Progresa/Oportunidades beneficiaries was 67 percent higher than demand in communities not participating in the program.
Apparently Nora Lustig, a member of the IFPRI Board of Trustees in 1994-97 and Senior Advisor on Poverty and Chief of the Inequality Unit of the Inter-American Development Bank in 1997-2001, played a major role in facilitating the conversation between IFPRI and PROGRESA about IFPRI undertaking the evaluation

The first documentation that I can find of that contact is an e-mail of 21 June 1995 of
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Infant mortality was found to fall at a rate 11 percent higher among beneficiaries compared to nonbeneficiaries. 23 Another study estimated a reduction of 11 percent on maternal mortality and a 2
19 See, for example, Parker (2005) and Schultz (2000) and references cited in Esquivel, Lustig and Scott (2010) and Greenspun (2011) . 20 Parker (2005) . 21 Schultz (2000) . 22 Bautista and others (2004) . 23 Barham (2005) .
percent reduction in infant mortality in rural communities compared to those not in the program.
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Improved access to education and these health gains may help explain recent changes in the relative earnings of the low-income workers. Better access to health services may have improved the productivity of low-skilled workers: for example, improved access to health services may have translated into fewer days of work missed due to illness. Better access to health services may have also improved the cognitive development of children in poor households, thereby improving their educational achievement and productivity. high regard for scholarly work and a genuine concern for making anti-poverty programs effective.
All five were scholars or researchers who became practitioners; and, to some extent, all five were practitioners who continued to do scholarly work (and some of them became scholars again). 
